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Liberalization of Opening Hours with Free Entry
Abstract
This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with
free entry. It is shown that under free competition a market failure arises:
Entry is excessive and opening hours are under-provided. Restrictions on
opening hours aggravate this failure.I analyze the impact of a liberalization of
opening hours. The model predicts that in the short run prices will remain
constant, but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will
rise and opening hours will increase in two steps,immediately after deregula-
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This paper addresses the issue of opening hours in the retail industry and its
liberalization. In the public and political debate, this topic is controversial.
Though there has been a substantial trend towards deregulation in recent
years, the debate is still ongoing. Restrictions on business hours diﬀer a lot
among European countries. For instance, in the UK and Sweden opening
hours in the retail industry are much more liberalized than in France or Nor-
way. In Germany, opening hours were highly regulated for the last decades,
but have been liberalized recently.
The focus of the present paper is on the relationship between liberalization
of opening hours and concentration in the retail sector. To this aim a model
of retail competition with free entry in the spirit of Salop (1979) is used.
However, in contrast to his model, competition between retailers takes place
in two dimensions. First, retailers compete in prices and second they com-
pete in opening hours. The question is whether the competitive outcome
is optimal or if restrictions on opening hours can improve on welfare. The
model suggests that the competitive outcome without any restrictions on
opening hours leads to a market failure with excessive entry into the market
and under-provision of business hours. Hence, restrictions on opening hours
do not help to improve on the market outcome. Even worse, regulating
opening hours works in the opposite direction. By restricting opening hours
even further entry is induced. Thus, restrictions on business hours are not
adequate to improve welfare, but aggravate the market failure.
Analyzing the impact of a liberalization of opening hours, the model in-
dicates that in the short run - where entry and exit in the market is not
possible - prices remain constant. However, in the longer run when entry
and exit is possible retail prices increase and the concentration in the retail
sector increases, i.e. the number of retail stores decreases. Furthermore,
the model suggests that opening hours increase in two steps. First, they
increase directly after liberalization and second they go up further as some
retailers leave the market. There is also a positive eﬀect on employment
from liberalization as total industry opening hours increase.
Beyond the public debate the issue of business hours (and its liberalization)
4has attracted considerable interest in the literature in recent years. Par-
ticularly, models are used in which the choice of opening hours acts as a
strategic variable in competition. Inderst and Irmen (2005) consider a two-
stage model with competition in prices and opening hours. In a model with
two symmetric ﬁrms, ﬁrms can use shopping time strategically as an ad-
ditional means to relax price competition by choosing asymmetric opening
hours when consumers have high preferences for their ideal shopping time.
Similarly, Shy and Stenbacka (2005) analyze a retail industry where compe-
tition takes place in opening hours and prices. The focus of their study is on
the impact of diﬀerent shopping time ﬂexibility assumptions. They study
scenarios where consumers are bi-directional, i.e. if a shop is closed at their
preferred shopping time, consumers can postpone or advance their shop-
ping. Furthermore, they explore situations where consumers are forward- or
backward-oriented, i.e. they either can postpone or advance. While the two
former contributions use models where consumers are distributed uniformly
along the time dimension, Shy and Stenbacka (2006) analyze a setting where
consumers’ ideal shopping times are distributed non-uniformly. They ﬁnd
that a monopoly supplier chooses ineﬃciently short opening hours. How-
ever, in contrast to the former two contributions, they treat prices as ﬁxed.
In addition, all models mentioned above take the industry structure as given
i.e. the number of active retail stores is assumed to be constant. This may
be an appropriate description in the short run where no entry or exit oc-
curs, but rather inappropriate when it comes to the long run as the industry
structure can adapt due to a deregulation of opening hours.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces
the model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium under liberalized opening
hours. Section 4 compares the competitive outcome to the socially optimal
one. Section 5 describes the equilibrium under regulated opening hours and
analyzes the impact of the abolishment of these regulations. Finally, section
6 concludes.
52 The model
Consider a spatially diﬀerentiated retail industry where stores oﬀer a ho-
mogenous retail product. Consumers in this market have preferences over
the location of retail stores and over opening hours. To formalize this, I
adopt the circular city model of Salop (1979) with a modiﬁcation to incor-
porate opening hours1.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are uniformly distributed on a circle of circumference one, rep-
resenting the spatial dimension. The location of a consumer, denoted by x,
is interpreted as his most preferred shopping location. If there is no store
at his preferred location, the consumer has to incur some costs to travel to
the next store. Consumers also value longer opening hours as this increases
their ﬂexibility of deciding when to go shopping. Consumers are assumed
to be homogenous in their valuation for opening hours2.
Consumers have the following utility if buying from store i:
U = V − t(disti)+θhi − pi (1)
where disti denotes the absolute distance to the retail store, and the pa-
rameter t is the associated measure of transportation costs. The variable hi
denotes the length of opening hours of the retailer’s store while the param-
eter θ measures the beneﬁt a consumer derives from an additional opening
1The extension used here is similar to variants used to study advertising in media
markets. Examples are Dukes (2004), Crampes et al. (2005) or Choi (2006). They intro-
duce a variable reﬂecting nuisance of consumers due to advertising that aﬀects consumers
negatively and generates revenues, while I introduce a variable that reﬂects the length of
opening hours that aﬀects consumers positively, but entails a cost to the ﬁrm.
2In the models by Inderst and Irmen (2005), Shy and Stenbacka (2005, 2006) consumers
diﬀer in location/taste and in their ideal shopping time while the model used here assumes
that all consumers have identical preferences for longer opening hours. The introduction
of two diﬀering consumer groups - one group values longer opening hours highly, one group
does not value longer opening hours at all - would not change the qualitative results of
the model.
6hour. Hence, this is the beneﬁt consumers derive from increased opening
hours due to more ﬂexibility. The price, pi, that the consumer is charged is
deducted from utility. The gross utility from consuming the retail product
- given by V - is assumed to be high enough such that each consumer buys.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each consumer buys a single unit of the
homogenous retail product3. The total mass of consumers is normalized to
one.
2.2 Retail stores
There are n retail stores, indexed by i, located equidistantly on the circle of
circumference one4. Without loss of generality store one is located at zero




All retail stores face identical, constant marginal costs for production of
the retail good. For simplicity, these costs of production are normalized
to zero. Stores also face costs for their opening hours: These costs are
assumed to amount to
g
2h2
i. Hence, marginal costs of extending the opening
time increases with the time already open. The economic rationale behind
this assumption is that stores may have a higher wage bill when extending
their business hours (e.g. overtime compensation, late night surcharges).
Additionally, ﬁrms have to pay ﬁxed costs of f for entering the market.
Competition between retail stores follows a two-stage game: In the ﬁrst
stage potential entrants can simultaneously enter the market or stay out.
To enter the market a ﬁxed payment of f has to be incurred. In the second
stage, those retailers who entered the market decide on price and opening
hours. These two decisions are made simultaneously by all active retailers.
The time structure imposed here reﬂects the fact that the entry decision
is a long-term decision and that prices and opening hours can be changed
relatively fast5. Respecting the time structure, I look for a subgame-perfect
3I assume that the quantity consumed does not depend on the length of opening hours.
Empirical evidence for this assumption is given in Skuterud (2005) for the case of dereg-
ulating Sunday opening hours in Canada.
4This paper does not consider the issue of location, and hence stores’ locations are
treated as exogenous. For further reading see Economides (1993).
5Alternatively, one could use a three stage game with entry in the ﬁrst stage, choice of
7equilibrium by applying backward induction.
3 Equilibrium
This section derives the equilibrium.
3.1 Static equilibrium
In a ﬁrst step I look for equilibrium prices and opening hours given a ﬁxed
number of stores in the retail market. I interpret the outcome as a short-run
equilibrium.
Given the symmetric structure of the model, I seek for an equilibrium in
which all stores charge the same price and have identical opening hours. I
therefore consider the decision to be made by a representative store i. Take
for instance the retail store located at x=0. Competition in this model is
local and takes place between store i and its two neighboring stores, (i-1) and
(i+1). Starting with the store (i+1), there is a consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying from the shop located at x=0 and the shop located at 1
n.
This marginal consumer - when ﬁrm i charges pi and opens hi while the
remaining (n-1) retailers charge p and have opening hours of h - is implicitly
given by






+ θh− p (2)
or explicitly by
xm =




Similarly, the retail shop faces a competitor located at n−1
n . The situation
is symmetric, hence demand is given by 2xm:
opening hours in the second stage and price competition in the last stage. However, this
time structure does not change the qualitative results.
8Di =




Demand depends positively on competitor’s price and negatively on the own
price. Longer own opening hours increase demand, and extended business
hours at competitors’ stores reduce demand.












i − f (5)
Retail stores decide simultaneously on prices and opening hours. The ﬁrst-
















− ghi = 0 (7)
The equilibrium with all retailers charging identical prices and having iden-









Result 1 The short-run equilibrium price increases in t and decreases in n.
The short-run equilibrium level of opening hours increases in θ and decreases
in n and g.
The equilibrium exhibits the expected properties of the equilibrium price.
The price does not diﬀer from the same model without opening hours as de-
scribed in Tirole (1988). Price depends positively on the degree of product
9diﬀerentiation (as perceived by consumers) and negatively on the number of
competitors in the market. The comparative static properties with respect
to the equilibrium opening hours are more interesting. As might be expected
opening hours depend positively on consumers valuation for increased shop-
ping time ﬂexibility and negatively on the costs for opening hours. Main
result, however, is that opening hours depend negatively on the number of
retail stores operating in the market. The reason for this result lies in the
fact that a larger number of stores reduces the price and hence reduces the
beneﬁt of attracting more customers via extended opening hours.
3.2 Equilibrium with entry
The analysis above has derived opening hours and prices when the number
of stores in the market is ﬁxed exogenously. In the long run, however, the
number of store need not be ﬁxed but may adapt. Hence, in a second step,
the number of retail stores is now derived.
It is assumed that to enter the market an investment of f has to be made.
Stores enter the market as long as they can earn positive proﬁts. The number
of these stores is denoted by nc. Considering the prices and opening hours










− f = 0 (10)








The associated price and opening hours are then:
6Literally, the number of retail stores has to be an integer. However, this integer

















2tg − θ2 (13)
The equilibrium under free entry is hence characterized by equations 11, 12,
13. Note that the term (2tg − θ2) has to be positive to allow for a positive
number of stores in equilibrium, an assumption that I will make from here
on.
Result 2 With free entry the number of retail stores decreases with f and θ,
and increases with t and g. The price increases with f and θ, and decreases
with g. The impact of t on the price is ambiguous. Opening hours increase
with f and θ, and decrease with t and g.
Proof. By diﬀerentiating equations 11, 12 and 13 with respect to the vari-
able of interest. Derivatives are given in appendix A.
Exogenous Variables
tfθg





Table 1: Comparative statics results
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics results. The impact of f and
t on the number of stores is as expected. Higher ﬁxed costs of entry re-
duce the number of ﬁrms and higher transportation costs as measured by t
increases the number of retailers that enter. More interesting are the com-
parative statics results on the number of retailers with respect to the costs
and beneﬁts of opening hours. Higher costs for extending opening hours
g lead to more stores, and a higher valuation for shopping time ﬂexibility
decreases the number of stores. The reasoning behind these results is the
following: As in equilibrium all stores have identical opening hours, no ad-
ditional demand is attracted by longer opening hours. However, stores face
11the costs of opening. From the perspective in the ﬁrst stage, these costs
work like additional ﬁxed costs on entry. Thus, factors that lead to longer
(shorter) opening hours work like an increase (decrease) in costs of entry.
Hence, a higher valuation for shopping time ﬂexibility, leading to longer
opening hours, leads to a smaller number of stores. The opposite holds for
the costs of extending opening hours. This eﬀect is an example of Sutton’s
endogenous sunk costs (Sutton, 1991).
The price increases with the ﬁxed costs f and valuation for shopping time
ﬂexibility θ as these variables reduce the number of retail stores. Higher
costs of extended business hours increases the number of stores and thus
leads to a decrease in the price. The comparative statics property of the
transportation cost parameter on the price is ambiguous. There are two
eﬀects at work, a direct one and an indirect one. The direct eﬀect is that for
a given number of retail stores a higher t leads to higher prices (see equation
8). The indirect eﬀect works via the number of stores. A higher t leads to
more stores, and more stores lead to increased competition, and hence lower
prices. For tg−θ2 > 0, the direct eﬀect dominates. However, for tg−θ2 < 0,
the indirect eﬀect is the larger one.
The comparative statics results concerning the length of opening hours are
intuitive. Costs of entry and consumers’ preferences for extended opening
hours let shops expand their business hours as both tend to reduce the
number of stores. The reverse holds for the transportation costs and the
costs for extending business hours. Both factors induce more stores to enter
and thus, have a negative impact on the length of opening hours chosen by
the retailers.
4 Welfare analysis
Does competition with entry and exit provide the socially optimal outcome?
This section determines the socially optimal number of retail stores and their
business hours. Social welfare is here deﬁned as the sum of consumer utility
(as given by equation 1) and proﬁts of the retail industry (equation 5). As
prices are mere transfers between consumers and retailers they are irrelevant
12for welfare. Thus social welfare comprises four parts: The transportation
costs of consumers, the beneﬁt of extended opening hours, the costs due to
opening hours, and the ﬁxed costs of entry.


















These two equations describe the social optimum. Inspecting the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to h it can be noticed that the opening hours chosen
in the competitive market are optimal if the number of active ﬁrms is the
optimal one (compare equation 15 with 9). If the number of stores is too
high (too low), opening hours are too short (long) in the market outcome
compared to the social optimum.
Solving the two equations for n and h gives the optimal number of active


















Comparing the equilibrium outcome with the socially optimal one, the fol-
lowing result can be established:
13Result 3 Compared to the social optimum, the market outcome leads to
excessive entry behavior and opening hours that are too short.
Proof. By comparing equation 11 with 17, and equation 13 with 18.
As in the original model by Salop (1979) entry is excessive. But in the
present model the result of excessive entry has also an impact on the length
of opening hours as it leads to under-provision of business hours (see equa-
tion 15). As the number of stores increases, opening hours are reduced.
The result of under-provision of business hours is also established in models
without entry (Shy and Stenbacka, 2005, 2006).
Since in the market equilibrium opening hours are already too short from a
social perspective, further restrictions on opening hours are useless to correct
for the market failure. However, a social planner that wants to implement
optimal opening hours need not address regulations of business hours, but
can tackle excessive entry, for instance by charging an additional entry cost.
If entry is optimal this leads automatically to optimal opening hours.
5 Regulation of opening hours and liberalization
In this section, the retail market is studied when opening hours are regulated
and how liberalization aﬀects the number of retailers in the market, the
price of the retail good and opening hours. As seen in the welfare analysis
of section 4 the competitive equilibrium with free entry already exhibits
under-provision of business hours. Hence, restricting opening hours can
never be welfare-improving.
5.1 Equilibrium under regulation
I start by characterizing equilibrium under regulation. Consistent with the
usual practice in many countries, the regulation studied here poses an upper
limit on the hours a retailer can stay open. However, retailers may choose
shorter opening hours. Imagine the market is now in a long-run equilibrium
such that no retailer wants to leave the market and no potential entrant
14wants to enter. The analysis of regulated opening hours is then only inter-
esting if the regulation is binding, i.e. retailers would like to open longer
but are not allowed to. If ﬁrms would choose shorter opening hours the
analysis would remain unchanged to the one in section 3. Thus I focus on
the case with a binding regulation. Denoting regulated opening hours by h,





ensures that regulation is binding.
Proceeding in an analogous way as in section 3 with opening hours being
























Note that there is a positive relationship between the degree of regulation
and the number of stores. The tighter regulation, i.e. the lower h, the more
stores enter the market. It shows that regulations on opening hours worsen
the competitive outcome. Instead of reducing entry - as is socially desirable
- it induces even more entry. However, tighter restrictions lead to lower
prices.
5.2 Impact of liberalization
I now turn to the impact of a liberalization of opening hours and consider the
following scenario. Before the liberalization, opening hours are regulated at
a upper limit of h and the market outcome is as described in section 5.1. By
liberalization this upper limit is abolished such that stores face no longer any
restrictions on their choice of opening hours. I analyze short-term and long-
term consequences of this liberalization on prices, opening hours, number of
stores and employment.
15Immediately after liberalization, price and opening hours may respond to
the deregulation. The number of retail stores, however, is still at its pre-
liberalization level nc. New price and opening hours are then described by
the short-run equilibrium of section 3. Hence, ˆ p = t
nc and ˆ h = θ
gnc > h.A
comparison with the equilibrium under regulation gives the short-run impact
of deregulation:
Result 4 In the short run after a liberalization prices remain unchanged
and opening hours are longer.
As the number of stores is unchanged, so is the price. This result is consistent
with the impact of deregulation in models without entry as long as stores
choose symmetric opening hours. Under asymmetric conﬁgurations - one
store opens longer or stores open at diﬀerent times - prices change due to
deregulation (Inderst and Irmen, 2005; Shy and Stenbacka, 2005).
When time is passing after deregulation entry and exit becomes possible,
and hence, the number of active retailers may change in response to the
liberalization. The long-run equilibrium is described by equations 11, 12,
and 13 in section 3. Comparison with the equilibrium under regulation gives
the long-run impact of liberalization:
Result 5 In the long run after a liberalization the number of retailers de-
creases, the price increases, and opening hours increase compared to the
pre-deregulation level and to the level immediately after deregulation.
Proof. Given in appendix B.
Prior to deregulation the market is in a free-entry equilibrium and hence
stores have zero proﬁts. As seen above, in the short run after deregula-
tion retailers extend opening hours, but prices remain at the previous level.
Thus, revenues are unchanged, but costs are higher than before the deregula-
tion. This leads to negative proﬁts, and some retail stores leave the market.
Hence, a long-run consequence of liberalization is a smaller number of re-
tailers in the market, or put diﬀerently a higher concentration in the retail
sector. This increase in concentration leads to higher prices for the retail
16good, but also to a further increase in the length of opening hours. The
result of higher prices due to liberalization is in contrast to Clemenz (1990).
In a model with consumer search he shows that liberalization of opening
hours decreases prices as longer opening hours facilitate search activities.
In the present paper the mechanism behind higher prices lies in a higher
concentration in the retail sector.
Finally, I consider employment eﬀects due to liberalization. Does liberal-
ization lead to more employment? As a measure of employment I take the
total number of opening hours in the industry. I ﬁnd that liberalization
has a positive eﬀect on total opening hours. Under regulation, total indus-
try opening hours amount to H = nch. Opening hours after liberalization
amount to H = ncˆ h = nchc = θ
g. Note that total industry opening hours
are equal in the short and in the long run after liberalization. The rea-
son is that as some retailers leave the market - leading ceteris paribus to a
decrease in total opening hours - opening hours increase at the remaining
stores. These two eﬀects cancel each other such that industry opening hours
remain unchanged.
Comparing industry opening hours before and after liberalization leads to
the following result:
Result 6 Liberalization leads to higher total industry opening hours.
Proof. Given in appendix C.
If total industry opening hours can be interpreted as a measure of employ-
ment, liberalization of opening hours leads to more employment in the retail
industry. This result is consistent with empirical evidence. For example,
Skuterud (2005) ﬁnds a positive employment eﬀect due to deregulation of
opening hours on Sundays in Canada. In his study, he estimates 8 to 12%
more employment in the retail sector. Burda and Weil (2005) ﬁnd evidence
for the US that restrictions on opening hours reduce employment inside and
outside the retail sector. They argue that this decrease is mainly a decrease
in part-time employment.
Summarizing, liberalization leads to increased concentration in the retail
sector, higher prices, and opening hours that increase in two steps, imme-
17diately after liberalization and over time as some stores exit the market.
Employment in the retail market is higher under liberalized opening hours
than under regulation. As already pointed out, welfare is higher under dereg-
ulation than under restricted opening hours. In fact, as shown in section
4 the competitive equilibrium exhibits excessive entry and under-provision
of opening hours. Instead of correcting this market failure, restrictions on
opening hours aggravate the market failure by inducing even more entry and
even shorter opening hours.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses a model with free entry in a diﬀerentiated oligopoly. In the
model, retailers compete in prices and opening hours. It is shown that com-
petitive markets lead to opening hours that are too short compared to the
socially optimal level. In contrast, entry in the market is excessive. Regula-
tions on opening hours do not attenuate the market failure, but worsen the
outcome. Studying the impact of a liberalization of shopping hours the pa-
per shows that the impact in the longer run diﬀers from the short-run eﬀect.
While in the short run prices remain constant, in the long run they increase.
This is due to the fact that after liberalization retail market concentration
rises and thus competition is relaxed. Opening hours increases in two steps:
First, they increase directly after the deregulation. Secondly, they increase
further over time as some retailers leave the market. In accordance with
empirical evidence the model used here predicts that employment in the
retail industry should rise.
A Comparative Statics of equilibrium with entry
I give the details of the comparative statics as given in result 2. The equi-
librium values of n, p, and h are given by equations 11, 12, 13.


































2tg − θ2 < 0 (25)






























































































gnc > 0 (33)
B Long-run impact of liberalization
Impact on the number of retailers
To show: nc < nc







which is true under the assumption that regulation is binding.
Impact on the price
To show: pc > pc ⇔ t
nc > t
nc. Since nc < nc this is true.
Impact on the opening hours
To show hc > ˆ h>h.
i) hc > ˆ h ⇔ θ
gnc > θ
gnc. Since nc < nc this is true.






Hence, hc > ˆ h>h.
20C Impact of liberalization on employment





which is true under the assumption of
binding regulation.
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